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USMH's Kanto supermarket group swings to an operating loss as its Aeon Food Style merger lifts revenue but not profit

United Super Markets Holdings, the Aeon group company behind Maruetsu, Kasumi and Inageya across greater Tokyo, posted a ¥3.28bn operating loss for the six months to August even as revenue rose 14.0% on the March merger that created Aeon Food Style -- rising costs outran the gain, and the company has now cut its full-year profit forecast 80%.

Flat-vector editorial illustration of a neighbourhood supermarket aisle in greater Tokyo, with a checkout counter, stacked shopping baskets and anonymous silhouette shoppers pushing carts.
Illustration by floortok.com

United Super Markets Holdings Co., Ltd. (USMH), the Aeon group holding company behind supermarket chains Maruetsu, Kasumi and Inageya across the Tokyo metropolitan area, said it swung to a consolidated operating loss of ¥3.28bn in the six months to August 31, from an operating profit of ¥168m a year earlier, even as revenue rose 14.0% to ¥544.8bn, according to the company's interim (決算短信) results, filed October 9.

The loss carried through the rest of the income statement: ordinary loss came to ¥3.34bn, against an ordinary profit of ¥32m a year earlier, and net loss attributable to parent-company shareholders widened to ¥4.65bn, from a ¥1.21bn net loss in the same period last year, the company said.

A merger built for scale, not yet for margin

Most of the revenue gain traces to a single event: in March 2026, USMH merged its existing Maxvalu Kanto subsidiary with Daiei's Kanto-region stores and Aeon Market Co. to form Aeon Food Style Co., Ltd. USMH said the combination is meant to push the food-retail business past ¥1 trillion in sales and establish a top-tier position across the capital region, and the new subsidiary's own standalone revenue reflects the scale-up directly: ¥87.1bn in the half, up 287.6% year on year.

But the group said gross margin fell across several subsidiaries as it strengthened pricing and promotions to compete, pointing in particular to the rising cost of input materials including naphtha-linked petroleum products; traffic and basket counts also came in below plan at some chains. Selling, general and administrative expenses rose 16.3% year on year, group-wide, outpacing a 13.6% rise in gross profit -- the gap that pushed the half into loss.

A mixed picture by chain

The four main subsidiaries diverged. Maruetsu's standalone revenue rose 2.4% to ¥207.8bn, but higher input costs and pricing measures cut its gross margin and SG&A growth ate further into profit, so both operating and ordinary profit fell year on year. Kasumi went the other way: standalone revenue fell 0.5% to ¥139.8bn on weaker footfall, even though its gross margin improved -- the revenue decline alone was enough to tip it into an operating and ordinary loss. Inageya's revenue rose 0.7% to ¥109.9bn, but margin pressure and higher SG&A again pulled both profit lines down. Aeon Food Style, for all its revenue scale-up, also posted an operating and ordinary loss, as pricing measures compressed margin and spending on store renovations added to costs.

Guidance cut, dividend held

USMH revised its full-year forecast down from the figures it last published. For the year to February 2027 it now expects revenue of ¥1,096.8bn, up 13.8%, but operating profit of just ¥1.0bn, down 80.2%, ordinary profit of ¥0.8bn, down 83.7%, and a full-year net loss attributable to parent-company shareholders of ¥8.0bn. The interim dividend was set at ¥8.00 per share, and USMH left its full-year dividend forecast unchanged at ¥16.00 per share.

Maruetsu, Kasumi and Inageya are neighbourhood fixtures for millions of Tokyo-area households, and USMH's own numbers are a clean read on how Aeon's strategy of consolidating regional supermarket chains for scale is actually landing: Aeon Food Style delivered the top-line jump it was built for, but the group as a whole is still absorbing input-cost inflation and renovation spending faster than it can pass them on. Whether that gap closes before the full-year forecast comes due is the thing to watch -- Aeon's bet is that scale eventually buys back the margin; this half shows it has not yet.